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Abstract—Adversarial perturbations can be added to images
to protect their content from unwanted inferences. These per-
turbations may, however, be ineffective against classifiers that
were not seen during the generation of the perturbation, or
against defenses based on re-quantization, median filtering or
JPEG compression. To address these limitations, we present an
adversarial attack that is specifically designed to protect visual
content against unseen classifiers and known defenses. We craft
perturbations using an iterative process that is based on the Fast
Gradient Signed Method and that randomly selects a classifier
and a defense, in each iteration. This randomization prevents
an undesirable overfitting to a specific classifier or defense. We
validate the proposed attack in both targeted and untargeted
settings on the private classes of the Places365-Standard dataset.
Using ResNet18, ResNet50, AlexNet and DenseNet161 as clas-
sifiers, the performance of the proposed attack exceeds that of
eleven state-of-the-art attacks.
Index Terms—Deep learning, adversarial images, privacy pro-
tection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Images shared online capture people and scenes that reveal
personal information, as well as information about personal
choices and preferences. This information can be automatically
inferred by classifiers. To prevent this potential privacy viola-
tion and to protect the visual content from unwanted automatic
inferences [1], we aim to exploit the vulnerability of classifiers
to adversarial attacks [2], [3], [4].
An adversarial attack should mislead classifiers that the at-
tacker has access to (seen classifiers), as well as classifiers that
the attacker has no information about, not even the prediction
output (unseen classifiers). However, adversarial attacks often
fail to mislead unseen classifiers as the generated adversarial
perturbations overfit to a specific classifier [5] or to an ensem-
ble of classifiers [6]. Adversarial images should also be robust
to defenses. Defenses can be based on re-quantization [7],
median filtering [7] and JPEG compression [8]. Moreover,
adversarial perturbations should not degrade the image quality,
especially when added for protecting privacy [1], [9].
In this paper, we propose an adversarial attack that aims
to mislead seen and unseen classifiers from inferring private
information present in an image, even when the classifiers are
equipped with known defenses. At the core of the proposed
attack, there is an iterative combination of random selections
of a classifier and a defense within a Fast Gradient Signed
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Method (FGSM) framework1 [12]. This random selection
avoids the creation of perturbations that overfit to a specific
classifier or defense, and improves the misleading rate for seen
and unseen classifiers. The proposed attack, which can work
in both targeted and untargeted settings, is related to methods
that are based on ensembles of classifiers [6] and of defense
transformations [5], [13], [14], but differs in the fact that both
classifiers and transformations are randomly chosen at each
iteration. Moreover, the proposed attack enables the use of
complex defense transformations with null derivative. We val-
idate the proposed attack for the protection of scene content on
the privacy subset of the Places365-Standard dataset [9], which
consists of scenes such as places of worship and hospitals.
We evaluate the attack for state-of-the-art classifiers, namely
ResNet18, ResNet50, AlexNet, and DenseNet161, based on
the misleading rate, detectability and image quality.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let x ∈ RW×H×C be an image of width W and height H
pixels, and C color channels whose dynamic ranges are
[0, 255]. Let M(·) be a D-class deep neural network classifier
with parameters θ and trained using the cost function JM (·).
Let yˆx be the true class associated with x. The classifier
outputs a prediction vector for x, px = (pi)Di=1 = M(x),
where pi represents the probability of x being associated with
class i ∈ {1, ..., D}. The predicted class for x, yx, is the most
likely of D classes:
yx = argmax
i=1,...,D
pi. (1)
Note that the predicted class might differ from the true class,
which is unknown during the execution of the adversarial
attack. Adversarial attacks for privacy protection should aim
to hide the true class, yˆx, from M(·), even when the predicted
class is incorrect. The adversarial perturbation, δx, added
to the original image, x, generates an adversarial image,
as x˙ = x+δx. This perturbation causes the classifier to predict
an adversarial class, yx˙, by decreasing the probability of the
predicted class, yx, (untargeted attack [12], [13], [15], [16])
until
yx˙ 6= yx, (2)
or by increasing the probability of a specific target class, yt,
(targeted attack [1], [3], [4], [6], [10], [12], [13]), such that
yx˙ = yt 6= yx. (3)
1FGSM is the iterative attack proposed by Kurakin et al. [10]. Note that this
attack is also known as Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [10] and as Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) attack with L∞ norm [11].
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS: CHOICE OF NORM AND
CORRESPONDING DENSITY OF THE PERTURBATION, WHICH CAN BE
SPARSE (S) OR DENSE (D). THE CLASS SELECTION (TYPE) CAN BE
UNTARGETED (U) OR TARGETED (T). AN ATTACK CAN BE DESIGNED FOR
MULTIPLE CLASSIFIERS (MC), AND TO WITHSTAND IMAGE
TRANSFORMATIONS (TRANS.).
Reference Attack Norm Perturbation Type MC Trans.
[3] JSMA L0 S T
[4] CW L0, L2, L∞ S, D T
[15] DeepFool L2 D U
[16] SparseFool L1 S U
[12] U-FGSM L∞ D U
[10] R-FGSM L∞ D T
[12] L-FGSM L∞ D T
[1] P-FGSM L∞ D T
[5] EOT L∞ D T 3
[13] DI-FGSM L∞ D U, T 3 3
[6] E-FGSM L∞ D T 3
Proposed RP-FGSM L∞ D U, T 3 3
The target class can be determined randomly [1], [12], sys-
tematically as the least-likely class [12], or adaptively from
the prediction vector [1].
Defenses against adversarial attacks aim to eliminate, prior
to inputting images to the classifier, the effect of possible
adversarial perturbations using a transformation, φ(·), namely
median filtering [7], re-quantization [7] or JPEG compres-
sion [8]. Moreover, to detect an image as adversarial, the
probability vector from a classifier for an image x˙ and its
transformed version, φ(x˙), can be compared with the L1 norm
as
‖M (x˙)−M (φ (x˙)) ‖1 > τ, (4)
where τ is learned to accept a specific false-positive rate [7].
III. BACKGROUND
Adversarial images are crafted by constraining the added
perturbation with, typically, an Lp norm between x and x˙.
Attacks may constrain the total number of perturbed pixels
(L0) [3], the sum of magnitudes (L1) [16], the Euclidean
distance (L2) [4], [15], or the maximum per-pixel variation
(L∞) [1], [6], [12]. As the optimization of the perturbation,
regularized by the norm, has no closed-form solution due to
non-linear operations with the parameters, θ, and non-convex
cost functions used to train the deep neural network classifiers,
several adversarial attacks iteratively generate the adversarial
image, x˙, as [12]:
x˙n+1 = x˙n + δx˙n , (5)
from x˙0 = x. The iteration process stops when a specific
number of iterations, N , is reached, i.e. x˙ = x˙N+1, or when
the misleading is achieved [3], [15]. N is typically chosen as
a function of parameters linked to the preservation of image
quality [3], [10]. Table I provides a comparative summary
of adversarial attacks. Moreover, Figure 1 shows examples
of the magnitude of perturbations generated by representative
adversarial attacks, which are described next.
JSMA [3], a targeted attack, uses the L0 norm and aims to
identify and perturb by one intensity unit, at each iteration, the
two most effective pixels. JSMA increases the probability of
Original JSMA CW DeepFool SparseFool
EOT DI-FGSM E-FGSM RP-FGSM
0 20 40 72+
Fig. 1. Cumulative adversarial perturbations (sum of the absolute difference
between original and adversarial images across the three color channels)
generated by JSMA, CW, DeepFool, SparseFool, EOT, DI-FGSM (untar-
geted), E-FGSM, and the proposed RP-FGSM (untargeted). CW and DeepFool
generate small perturbations. JSMA and SparseFool generate large, but sparse,
perturbations. EOT, DI-FGSM, E-FGSM and RP-FGSM are in between these
two groups, with perturbations that are dense across the whole image, but
small.
the target class, yt, compared with that of any other classes,
using a saliency score, S(·), which determines the effect of
perturbing a pixel, xi ∈ x:
S(xi, yt) = (6){
0 if ∇xiMt(x) < 0 or
∑
j 6=t∇xiMj(x) > 0(
∇xiMt(x)
)∥∥∥∑j 6=t∇xiMj(x)∥∥∥
1
otherwise,
where ∇xiMt(x) is the gradient of the target class, yt, with
respect to pixel xi. The attack iteratively generates the pertur-
bation, until the adversarial image is classified as the target
class or a specified number of pixels have been perturbed.
Carlini-Wagner (CW) [4], a targeted attack, maximizes the
difference between the logarithmic probabilities of the target
class and other classes using the L2 norm. Three forms of
selecting the target classes were used, namely uniform random
selection, second- and least-likely cases.
DeepFool [15], an untargeted attack, crafts adversarial
perturbations controlled by the L2 norm. At each iteration,
the adversarial perturbation is the orthogonal projection of
the adversarial image from the previous iteration onto the
closest linearized class boundary of M(·). The final adversarial
image, x˙ = x˙N+1, is the one that exceeds the closest class
boundary as
x˙N+1 = x˙N + (1 + η)δx˙N , (7)
where η  1 and δx˙N is the final adversarial perturbation.
As DeepFool might generate adversarial images whose pixels
exceed the allowed dynamic range, SparseFool [16], an untar-
geted attack similar to DeepFool, clips the pixel values within
[l,u], as
min ‖x˙− x‖1 s.t. yx˙ 6= yx and l ≤ x˙ ≤ u. (8)
This minimization is solved based on the low-mean curvature
properties of the decision boundary of each image [17]. Note
that, unlike DeepFool, SparseFool uses the L1 norm, thus
generating sparse perturbations.
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The family of attacks based on FGSM generates the per-
turbation in the direction of the cost function, JM (·), in order
to maximize the cost of remaining in the predicted class yx
(untargeted) or to minimize the cost of predicting the targeted
class yt (targeted):
δx =
{
δ sign (∇xJM (θ,x, yx)) untargeted attack,
−δ sign (∇xJM (θ,x, yt)) targeted attack,
(9)
where δ controls the magnitude of the perturbation, sign(·)
is the sign function and ∇xJM (·) is the gradient of the cost
function, JM (·), showing the updated direction with respect
to x. FGSM-based attacks use the L∞ norm and limit x˙ to
the -neighborhood of x and within the dynamic range of an
image at each iteration, as
x˙n+1 = Cx, (x˙n + δx˙n) , (10)
where Cx,(·) is a clipping function, defined as
Cx,(x˙) = min
{
255,x + ,max {0,x− , x˙}}. (11)
The value of  is a trade-off between the misleading rate and
the quality of the adversarial image: the larger , the higher
the potential misleading rate but, also, the stronger the image
degradation.
To evade defenses based on transformations and to preserve
visual quality, Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) [5] op-
timizes the loss on the target class over a set of pre-defined 2D
transformations, Φ2D, while minimizing the distance between
the transformed original image and the transformed adversarial
image in the Lab color space [18]:
x˙n+1 = Cx,(x˙n − δ sign(∇xJM (θ, φ2D(x˙n), yt)+
+ λ‖L(φ2D(x˙n))− L(φ2D(x˙n))‖2),
(12)
where L(·) is a function that converts images from the RGB
to the Lab color space, λ controls the visual similarity,
and φ2D(·) ∈ Φ2D is an image transformation chosen with
uniform random probability at each iteration.
To increase the misleading rate with unseen classifiers,
similarly to EOT, Diverse Input Fast Gradient Sign Method
(DI-FGSM) [13] applies a random resizing followed by a
padding transformation, with a pre-defined probability, on the
adversarial image in each iteration.
To improve misleading performance with unseen classifiers,
Ensemble FGSM (E-FGSM) [6] employs multiple classifiers,
Mk, simultaneously when creating the perturbation:
x˙n+1 = Cx,
(
x˙n − δ sign
(
K∑
k=1
∇xJMk (θ, x˙n, yt)
))
,
(13)
where K ≥ 1. However, the use of all available classifiers in
each iteration results in an overfitting that limits the ability of
the adversarial image to mislead unseen classifiers [13].
Regarding the approach for selecting the target class, Least-
likely FGSM (L-FGSM) [12] selects the least-likely pre-
dicted class. However, this systematic target class selection
can compromise the privacy of the image, as the selection
process can be reversed [1]. Random-FGSM (R-FGSM) [10],
E-FGSM [6] and EOT [5] randomly select the target class
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY IN THE TEST SET OF THE PRIVATE
PLACES365 DATASET FOR RESNET18, RESNET50, ALEXNET AND
DENSENET161.
ResNet18 ResNet50 AlexNet DenseNet161
Top-1 Top-5 Top-1 Top-5 Top-1 Top-5 Top-1 Top-5
54.6 84.4 56.4 86.5 47.7 79.0 58.4 86.6
from all possible classes except the predicted class and the
risk of reversibility is negligible. However, when the goal of
adversarial attack is to hide the true class, which may not be
the same as the predicted class (see Table II), this strategy
can result in the selection of the true class as the target!
For applications such as privacy protection, Private-FGSM
(P-FGSM) [1] avoids targeting the true class by discarding
from the selection process the top predicted classes, which
are more likely to contain the true class. The selection from
the remaining classes is still random, thus limiting the risk of
reversibility. Instead, untargeted approaches [12], [13] do not
need the selection of a target class. However, knowledge of
the true class is required for privacy protection.
IV. ROBUST AND PRIVATE FGSM
We aim to generate adversarial perturbations that protect
the true class of images and thus protect the private informa-
tion they contain from unwanted automatic inferences. These
adversarial perturbations should be robust to defenses, be
undetectable, preserve image quality, and mislead both seen
and unseen classifiers.
We propose an iterative approach, Robust Private FGSM
(RP-FGSM), that avoids overfitting by randomly selecting, in
each iteration, a classifier to attack and a defense to evade.
The proposed approach differs from E-FGSM [6] and DI-
FGSM [13], which consider an ensemble of classifiers, and
from EOT [5] and DI-FGSM [13], which use only non-
defense transformations (e.g. rotations). Moreover, as in other
FGSM-based attacks [12], RP-FGSM maintains image quality
inherently by controlling the magnitude of the perturbation
with the parameter . The block diagram of RP-FGSM is
shown in Figure 2.
Let M = {Mk}Kk=1 be a set of K ≥ 1 classifiers, and Φ =
{φf}Ff=0 be a set of F defense transformations, where φ0
is the identity function (i.e. no transformation is applied to
the input). For a classifier Mk and transformation φf , let ykx˙
and ykφf (x˙) be the predicted class (Eq. 1) of the adversarial
image, x˙, and the transformed adversarial image, φf (x˙),
respectively. We generate the adversarial image, x˙, for x,
whose true class is yˆx, as
yˆx 6= ykx˙ and yˆx 6= ykφf (x˙) ∀f, k. (14)
The process is initialized with x˙0 = x and ends with
x˙ = x˙N+1. At each iteration, n, we randomly select a transfor-
mation φr = R(Φ) ∈ Φ and a classifier Mr = R(M) ∈M,
where R(·) represents a function that randomly, with equal
importance, selects classifiers and transformations.
We use the most effective defense transformations, namely
re-quantization [7], median filtering [7] and JPEG compres-
sion [8]. Both re-quantization and JPEG compression have a
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Fig. 2. Block diagram for the proposed adversarial attack, RP-FGSM. KEY – x: original image; r: random index for selection of transformation and classifier;
φr(·): randomly chosen defense transformation; Mr(·): randomly chosen classifier; ∇xJMr : gradient of the cost function J(·) for the classifier Mr(·) when
predicting class yt (targeted) or yrx (untargeted) with respect to x; δ: magnitude of the perturbation added at each iteration; : parameter that controls the
clipping function to maintain intensity values of each pixel within the -neighborhood of the original intensity value; γ: parameter for target class selection;
N : number of iterations; x˙n+1: adversarial image at iteration n + 1. Note that when multiple classifiers are employed, the target class selection uses the
intersection of the prediction vectors, as indicated in Eq. 17.
quantization and rounding step, where the derivative, needed
to compute the perturbation, is zero for almost every pixel,
thus resulting in a null adversarial perturbation. We prevent
the generation of a null perturbation when applying these
transformations by approximating the image x˙n as x˜n =
bx˙ne + (x˙n − bx˙ne)3, where b·e represents the rounding
operator to the nearest integer, whose derivative is unlikely
to be zero [19]. To avoid overfitting to certain transformations
and parameters, the parameters of each transformation (i.e. the
number of bits for re-quantization, the kernel size for median
filter and the compression parameters for JPEG compression)
are also chosen randomly from a pre-defined set of values [13]
(more details in Sec. V-B).
RP-FGSM can craft an adversarial image using targeted or
untargeted attack by adding, at each iteration, the perturbation
δx˙n =
{
δ sign(∇xJMr (θ, φr(x˙n), yrx)) untargeted,
−δ sign(∇xJMr (θ, φr(x˙n), yt)) targeted,
(15)
where yrx is the class predicted by the classifier Mr(·).
Moreover, RP-FGSM maintains the perturbation within the -
neighborhood of x˙ as
x˙n+1 = Cx, (x˙n + δx˙n) , (16)
where Cx,(·) is the clipping function (Eq. 11).
Untargeted RP-FGSM crafts the adversarial perturbation in
such a way that the predicted adversarial class moves farther
away, in the decision space, from the most-likely predicted
class for each classifier, which we assume to be in the
neighborhood of the true class.
Targeted RP-FGSM selects the target class from a set that
is more likely to exclude the true class, by leveraging the fact
that the true class is often among the top classes predicted by
a classifier [1]. Moreover, we reduce the risk that an attack is
reversed by randomly selecting the target class. Specifically,
we exploit the prediction probability vectors {pkx} of the K
Fig. 3. Influence of γ on the number of candidate target classes, obtained as
intersection of the subsets of classes whose cumulative probability exceeds
the threshold γ. The plot is generated for 3000 images from the scene privacy
subset defined in [9]) using ResNet18, ResNet50 and AlexNet. The horizontal
line within the box is the median; the lower and upper edges are the 25-
percentile and 75-percentile, respectively. Each dot represents outliers beyond
2.7 standard deviations from the average. When γ = 0.1, the median of the
number of candidate classes is 364 (i.e. the target class is chosen from all but
the predicted class for most images). As γ increases, the number of target-
class candidates decreases. When γ = 0.99, the median decreases to 307
with a distribution that is more likely to exclude the true class from target
class selection.
classifiers. Let p′kx = (p
′k
i )
D
i=1 contain the elements of p
k
x
sorted in descending order. The target class is selected as
yt = R
′
(
K⋂
k=1
{
yj+1 :
j∑
i=1
p′ki > γ
})
, (17)
where j ∈ {1, ..., D} and R′(·) is the function that randomly
selects an element from the set of candidate target classes,
obtained as the intersection of the subset of classes whose
cumulative probability exceeds a threshold γ ∈ [0, 1]. The
larger γ, the fewer the classes. Figure 3 shows the influence
of γ on the number of classes that the target class yt is selected
from.
After N iterations, the attack uses, on average, each classi-
fier N/K times and each transformation N/F times. The number
APRIL 2020 5
of iterations N might affect the quality of the image and
therefore it is commonly chosen as a function of  [10] (see
Sec. V-B).
V. VALIDATION
A. Experimental setup
We compare the targeted and untargeted versions of
the proposed attack, Robust Private FGSM (RP-FGSM),
with eleven state-of-the-art methods, namely Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) [3], Carlini-Wagner (CW)
with L2 norm [4], DeepFool [15], SparseFool [16], iter-
ative untargeted FGSM (U-FGSM) [12], Random FGSM
(R-FGSM) [10], Least-likely FGSM (L-FGSM) [12], Pri-
vate FGSM (P-FGSM) [1], Expectation Over Transformation
(EOT) [5], Diverse Input FGSM (DI-FGSM, targeted and
untargeted versions) [13] and Ensemble FGSM (E-FGSM) [6].
JSMA, CW, DeepFool and SparseFool are run with the param-
eters proposed by their authors. The target class for JSMA is
the one that introduces the smallest perturbation, whereas for
CW it is the second most-likely predicted class. The target
class is the least-likely predicted class for L-FGSM, chosen
as described in Eq. 17 for P-FGSM and RP-FGSM, and, for
the other targeted FGSM-based attacks, is selected randomly
from the set of possible classes, excluding the predicted class
of the original image. For untargeted FGSM-based attacks, we
use the predicted class to craft the adversarial perturbation.
The Places365-Standard dataset [20], which has over 1.8
million images of 365 scene classes, is used for training
the classifiers (see Table II). We use, as test set, the scene
privacy subset of the validation set defined for the MediaEval
2018 Pixel Privacy Challenge [9], which comprises 60 private
classes2, that are a subset of the classes of the Places365-
Standard dataset [20]. The test set is composed of 3,000 im-
ages, with 50 images from each of the (60) private classes. We
consider four state-of-the-art classifiers, namely ResNet [21]
with 18 and 50 layers, AlexNet [22] and DenseNet161 [23],
trained for scene classification [20]3. Table II reports their
classification accuracy on the test set. Adversarial attacks
are performed on ResNet18, ResNet50 and AlexNet, whereas
DenseNet161, the most accurate classifier, is only used as
an unseen classifier for testing. This represents the most
challenging setup, given that the largest and most accurate
classifier was never seen by the adversarial attacks [6].
2The subset of private classes includes scenes that may require, for
various reasons, privacy protection, such as army-base, bathroom, bedchamb,
bedroom, church (indoor and outdoor), hospital and hospital-room, nursing-
home, pharmacy, sauna, shower, swimming pool (indoor and outdoor),
jacuzzi (indoor), temple (Asia); as well as scenes that would disclose private
personal information, such as airplane-cabin, airport terminal, amusement-
park, aqueduct, bank-vault, bar, beach, beach-house, beer-garden, beer-hall,
berth, bullring, bus-interior, bus station/indoor, campsite, car-interior, castle,
catacomb, chalet, child-room, classroom, closet, coast, discotheque, dorm-
room, drugstore, gymnasium (indoor), home-office, kindergarten-classroom,
locker-room, mosque (outdoor), playground, playroom, pub (indoor), sandbox,
schoolhouse, ski-resort, ski-slope, slum, swimming-hole, train-interior, train
station/platform, tree-house, and waiting-room. Note that we do not force the
target class to be out of the 60 private class, as this would restrict the diversity
of target class and would disclose the private classes.
3https://github.com/CSAILVision/places365
B. Implementation details
We compare all FGSM-based attacks with the same pa-
rameters proposed in Kurakin et al. [12]. The adversarial
noise per iteration is δ = 1, which corresponds to the
smallest variation in an 8-bit image. We constrain the max-
imum perturbation magnitude by setting  = 16, to provide
a trade-off between the misleading rate and image quality
degradation [13]. For a fair comparison, we ensure that all
FGSM-based attacks, either employing one classifier or an
ensemble of classifiers (E-FGSM and DI-FGSM), perform the
same number of forward/backward passes on the classifiers,
with N = min(1.25 ,  + 4) [12] iterations. The number
of iterations for RP-FGSM is N = N · K, as only one
classifier is used at each iteration (ensembles use all classifiers
at each iteration). This ensures that all attacks that employ K
classifiers perform K·N forward/backward passes in total.
For EOT, we use as 2D transformations, Φ2D, scaling,
translation, rotation, lightening, darkening and additive Gaus-
sian noise. The specific parameters of the transformations are
chosen randomly from pre-defined intervals as follows: scaling
with a factor between 0.8 and 1.2; translation between -0.2
and 0.2 times the image width; rotation between -60 and
60 degrees; lightening/darkening between 0 and 13 intensity
points; and Gaussian noise with zero mean and 25 variance.
We set λ = 0.5 to achieve a misleading rate of approximately
90%, as suggested by the authors [5]. For DI-FGSM, we
employ random resizing followed by random padding with
a probability of 50% in each iteration. Original images x ∈
R224×224×C are resized and padded to x ∈ Rr×r×C with r
randomly chosen within the range [200, 224).
The parameters for the defense transformations are: for re-
quantization, 1 to 7 bits per color channel in steps of 1 [7];
for median filtering, squared kernel of dimensions 2, 3 and
5 [7]; and for lossy JPEG compression, quality parameters
25, 50, 75 and 100 [24], [25]. For RP-FGSM, we randomly
and uniformly select the transformation to apply to the image
at each iteration, by selecting the parameters (i.e. number of
bits for re-quantization, kernel dimension for median filtering
and compression factor for JPEG compression) from the same
sets used for the defense. Similarly to Li et al. [1], in targeted
attacks, we use γ = 0.99 for target class selection.
C. Performance measures
We consider as performance measures the misleading rate,
detectability and image quality.
Misleading rate is quantified as the ratio between the
number of adversarial images that mislead the classifier with
respect to the true class and the total number of images,
expressed as a percentage. The higher the misleading rate in
top ranks, the better the privacy protection. We consider as
ranks top-1 and top-5. The misleading rate is calculated for
seen and unseen classifiers, and with and without defenses.
Detectability is the percentage of correctly detected adver-
sarial images with respect to the total number of images. We
distinguish between adversarial images and original images
by learning a threshold, τ , for each detector (re-quantization,
median and JPEG compression) by accepting 5% of the
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the privacy properties for: JSMA , CW , DeepFool ,
SparseFool , U-FGSM , R-FGSM , L-FGSM , P-FGSM , EOT ,
DI-FGSM (targeted) , DI-FGSM (untargeted) , E-FGSM , RP-FGSM
(targeted) and RP-FGSM (untargeted) . For visualization purposes, all
measures are normalized in the range 0-100%. The right column is a zoom of
the dashed rectangle. KEY: MS, misleading a seen classifier; MU, misleading
an unseen classifier; MSwD, MS with defense; MUwD, MU with defense;
Image quality measured by BRISQUE [26].
original (training) images as adversarial (i.e. 5% false positive
detection rate) (Eq. 4) [7].
Image quality is evaluated with Blind Referenceless Image
Spatial Quality Evaluator (BRISQUE) [26], a no-reference
measure; and Peak-Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Most
Apparent Distortion (MAD) [27], two full-reference measures.
BRISQUE [26] quantifies distortions and unnaturalness. The
lower the BRISQUE score, the better the image quality. PSNR
quantifies the pixel-by-pixel difference between two images.
The higher the PSNR, the smaller the added perturbation
(and therefore, the better the image quality). MAD aims
at measuring the perceived quality under different levels of
distortion [27]. The lower the MAD score, the higher the
image quality.
D. Evaluation of privacy protection
Figure 4 compares the results of RP-FGSM with those of
the eleven considered state-of-the-art attacks. For visualization
purposes, all metrics are normalized using their known ranges
to 0 and 100%, where a higher value is more desirable.
We report undetectability, the inverse of detectability; the
top-1 misleading rate with seen (unseen) classifiers obtained
with ResNet50 (DenseNet161); and image quality in terms of
naturalness, BRISQUE. We report the results of the attacks
when using the classifier (or combination of classifiers) with
the highest misleading rate: ResNet50 for attacks that use a
single classifier, and the combination of ResNet18, ResNet50
and AlexNet for attacks that use more than one classifier.
The first and second rows of Figure 4 show the trade-off
between misleading seen (unseen) classifiers with and without
defenses. The proposed attack outperforms the other attacks
in these two plots (i.e. is nearer to the top-right corner of
the plot). The third row of Figure 4 shows the relationship
between image quality and undetectability. We can observe
that all attacks obtain similar image quality, whereas attacks
can be divided into two groups for the undetectability, those
below 40% (CW, DeepFool, R-FGSM, L-FGSM, P-FGSM,
EOT, E-FGSM, and DI-FGSM targeted), and higher than 40%
(JSMA, SparseFool, U-FGSM, and DI-FGSM untargeted). The
proposed attack RP-FGSM, in both targeted and untargeted
versions, is within the group of less detectable attacks.
Table III summarizes all performance measures. For seen
classifiers, JSMA, CW, DeepFool and SparseFool have the
lowest misleading rate (lower than 30% in top-5) as they craft
their perturbation towards the closest class to the predicted
class and the resulting class of the adversarial image could
be the true class that we aim to protect (see Table II).
Instead, targeted (untargeted) FGSM-based attacks have higher
misleading rates because they move the prediction of the
adversarial image closer to (farther from) the target (predicted)
class at each iteration. The misleading rates of EOT are only
between 67.4% and 72.7% in top-5, showing a limited ability
to mislead the classifier when no transformation is applied.
The misleading rates of untargeted FGSM-based attacks, such
as U-FGSM and DI-FGSM, are above 84.3% in top-5, whereas
those of RP-FGSM are above 86.9% when attacking a single
classifier. Targeted FGSM-based attacks such as R-FGSM, L-
FGSM and P-FGSM obtain the highest misleading rates (above
95% in top-5). Similar results are obtained by attacks that
use an ensemble of classifiers (E-FGSM and DI-FGSM). The
target (untargeted) version of RP-FGSM obtains comparable
results to the other FGSM-based attacks, i.e. above 97.8%
(88.5%) in the top-5.
For an unseen classifier (i.e. DenseNet161), JSMA, CW,
DeepFool, SparseFool and EOT obtain low misleading rates
(under 14.8% in the top-5). Similarly to the above results for
seen classifiers, targeted FGSM attacks such as R-FGSM, L-
FGSM, P-FGSM and E-FGSM (attacking a single classifier)
obtain a higher performance, with misleading rates between
17.8% and 32.7% in the top-5. The highest misleading rates
are provided by DI-FGSM and RP-FGSM when using three
classifiers for generating the attack. In their targeted versions,
they obtain misleading rates of 65.0% and 64.6% in the top-5,
respectively, while the untargeted versions reach 76.0% and
82.6%, respectively. Adversarial attacks that combine classi-
fiers obtain the highest misleading rates in unseen classifiers.
Targeted DI-FGSM and RP-FGSM have comparable results
(0.4% difference), while untargeted RP-FGSM outperforms
untargeted DI-FGSM by more than 6%, thus indicating that
the random selection of classifiers and transformations is an
effective strategy for privacy protection.
For seen classifiers with defenses, JSMA, CW, DeepFool
and SparseFool have low misleading rates (less than 21.2%
in the top-5). Targeted attacks such as R-FGSM, L-FGSM,
P-FGSM, EOT and E-FGSM (attacking one classifier) obtain
much lower misleading rates compared to when no defenses
are employed (19.8% - 53.4% in the top-5). Also in this case,
untargeted FGSM-based attacks perform the best in the top-5
(above 47.4% for U-FGSM and above 59.3% for DI-FGSM).
RP-FGSM outperforms all attacks when three classifiers are
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TABLE III
PRIVACY PROTECTION RESULTS IN THE TEST SPLIT OF PRIVATE PLACES365 DATASET FOR MISLEADING RATE, WITH AND WITHOUT DEFENSES,
DETECTABILITY AND IMAGE QUALITY. MEASURES ARE REPORTED AS AVERAGE OF THE DATASET. STANDARD DEVIATION FOR IMAGE QUALITY IS
SHOWN IN BRACKETS. GRAY SHADING INDICATES UNSEEN CLASSIFIER. BOLD FONT INDICATES THE BEST PERFORMING ATTACK FOR A GIVEN
PERFORMANCE MEASURE. KEY – ATT.: ATTACK CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES; R18: RESNET18; R50: RESNET50; A: ALEXNET; DN:
DENSENET161; DET.: DETECTABILITY; BRISQUE: BLIND REFERENCELESS IMAGE SPATIAL QUALITY EVALUATOR; PSNR: PEAK-SIGNAL-TO-NOISE
RATIO; MAD: MOST APPARENT DISTORTION; JSMA: JACOBIAN-BASED SALIENCY MAP ATTACK; CW: CARLINIWAGNER; DF: DEEPFOOL; SF:
SPARSEFOOL; U-FG: UNTARGETED FGSM; R-FG: RANDOM FGSM; L-FG: LEAST-LIKELY FGSM; P-FG: PRIVATE FGSM; EOT: EXPECTATION OVER
TRANSFORMATION; DI-FG: DIVERSE INPUT FGSM; E-FG: ENSEMBLE FGSM; RP-FGSM: ROBUST PRIVATE FGSM, THE PROPOSED ATTACK; T:
TARGETED ATTACK; U: UNTARGETED ATTACK.
Misleading ↑ Misleading with defenses ↑
Det. ↓
Image quality
Att. Classifier R18 R50 A DN R18 R50 A DN BRISQUE ↓ PSNR ↑ MAD ↓T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5
JS
M
A R18 85.3 16.4 44.5 13.8 52.6 21.3 42.1 13.4 45.4 14.9 44.0 13.3 51.7 19.9 42.1 13.6 25.3 51.2 (13.9) 50.6 (7.4) 16.2 (8.1)
R50 46.4 16.2 84.0 14.6 52.7 21.3 42.4 13.5 44.6 15.1 44.3 13.8 51.5 19.7 42.0 13.0 33.9 51.0 (14.0) 50.4 (7.4) 12.6 (7.3)
A 45.6 15.6 43.8 13.8 85.6 22.3 41.5 13.3 44.7 15.0 43.5 13.3 52.2 19.9 41.5 13.3 26.8 51.0 (14.1) 48.8 (7.1) 13.0 (7.4)
C
W
R18 83.8 25.6 44.7 13.8 52.3 21.3 42.5 13.6 50.6 16.4 44.0 13.3 51.5 19.9 42.4 13.5 72.0 48.5 (14.0) 51.1 (0.4) 0.0 (0.1)
R50 46.9 16.3 83.8 22.7 52.5 21.1 43.1 13.8 45.1 15.2 47.8 14.7 51.7 19.7 42.8 12.8 74.4 48.6 (14.0) 51.0 (0.4) 0.0 (0.1)
A 45.2 15.8 43.6 13.7 84.4 30.0 41.7 13.5 44.6 15.0 43.3 13.4 56.1 20.9 41.8 13.4 71.9 48.8 (14.1) 51.0 (0.5) 0.0 (0.1)
D
F
R18 82.6 28.5 47.0 16.6 45.2 15.9 42.8 13.6 50.5 16.7 43.7 13.3 51.6 20.0 42.6 13.4 74.6 48.1 (13.7) 50.1 (3.7) 1.4 (7.4)
R50 44.9 13.6 80.8 24.5 43.3 13.8 43.7 13.9 45.6 15.2 48.4 15.4 51.8 19.8 43.0 13.0 76.6 48.2 (13.7) 49.6 (4.3) 2.1 (10.6)
A 52.4 21.3 52.6 21.3 82.1 32.1 42.0 13.5 44.9 14.9 43.4 13.4 56.5 21.2 41.9 13.5 74.3 48.5 (13.7) 50.0 (3.5) 2.8 (12.2)
SF
R18 85.9 18.0 46.1 14.4 55.3 23.0 43.3 14.3 45.4 15.1 44.0 13.2 51.9 20.2 42.8 13.2 34.8 53.1 (13.9) 38.9 (8.6) 44.5 (31.7)
R50 50.0 17.7 85.3 15.1 56.3 22.6 44.4 14.4 44.9 15.2 44.7 13.5 52.7 21.2 42.7 13.0 42.1 52.9 (13.9) 38.4 (8.7) 45.1 (32.0)
A 46.4 16.3 44.2 14.0 85.9 23.0 41.7 13.6 45.5 15.1 43.7 13.5 53.6 20.4 41.8 13.3 22.4 51.4 (14.0) 40.7 (7.7) 28.5 (24.9)
U
-F
G R18 92.4 86.1 86.6 55.9 67.8 34.3 85.5 53.5 86.1 59.7 67.0 32.6 62.5 29.4 67.1 33.4 58.1 45.6 (12.5) 32.0 (0.9) 26.1 (8.3)
R50 85.9 54.4 91.7 84.3 65.0 31.0 86.1 53.3 69.6 34.1 80.3 47.4 61.5 27.0 67.2 32.4 52.1 45.3 (12.8) 32.5 (0.9) 24.1 (8.3)
A 72.3 40.2 67.0 32.9 93.8 88.7 63.5 28.6 66.4 31.8 60.8 27.2 91.2 73.8 58.0 24.5 47.2 29.7 (17.1) 29.9 (0.8) 34.0 (9.2)
R
-F
G R18 72.3 40.2 67.0 32.9 93.8 88.7 63.5 28.6 69.9 40.6 53.3 21.2 56.5 25.6 50.2 19.5 94.3 45.9 (12.7) 33.1 (1.0) 20.7 (8.3)
R50 63.1 32.7 99.9 97.0 59.3 27.2 59.3 27.4 55.3 23.0 63.4 31.4 56.0 24.2 49.9 18.8 95.8 44.9 (13.0) 33.4 (1.0) 20.2 (8.3)
A 53.9 23.1 52.3 19.9 99.8 96.4 49.6 17.8 52.1 20.0 50.1 19.0 74.0 46.5 47.6 17.0 96.7 34.7 (16.5) 32.4 (1.0) 19.3 (8.2)
L
-F
G R18 100.0 99.8 64.4 34.4 62.0 30.1 61.5 32.0 74.1 45.3 54.5 23.4 58.4 27.1 52.1 21.3 99.3 46.3 (12.6) 32.7 (1.0) 19.2 (8.2)
R50 68.0 38.8 100.0 99.7 60.3 28.1 62.4 32.7 57.0 25.0 66.3 34.6 57.2 25.2 52.9 22.2 99.9 45.1 (13.1) 32.9 (0.9) 18.7 (8.3)
A 56.9 25.8 53.4 21.7 100.0 99.7 51.3 19.5 54.0 23.2 51.6 19.9 79.0 53.4 49.5 18.4 99.6 34.9 (16.5) 32.0 (0.8) 19.6 (8.3)
P-
FG
R18 100.0 97.4 60.4 29.0 60.7 28.3 57.0 26.9 71.2 39.1 53.5 20.7 57.3 25.4 51.3 19.2 93.6 45.9 (12.7) 33.2 (1.0) 22.4 (8.4)
R50 63.8 33.0 99.8 97.0 59.5 26.9 58.6 27.3 55.0 23.1 63.2 30.7 56.6 24.7 51.5 19.3 96.2 44.9 (13.0) 33.3 (1.0) 21.4 (8.5)
A 55.1 23.4 52.9 19.7 99.7 96.1 49.6 18.5 52.5 20.6 50.2 19.0 75.1 47.0 47.8 17.4 95.4 34.8 (16.4) 32.4 (0.9) 24.4 (9.0)
E
O
T R18 94.0 72.0 48.3 17.5 54.2 22.5 46.1 15.8 56.8 23.0 46.9 15.5 52.8 21.6 44.0 14.4 93.4 45.3 (13.6) 42.3 (2.1) 3.2 (4.0)R50 50.9 20.6 91.3 67.4 54.0 22.2 47.1 16.9 48.6 17.9 52.3 19.8 52.9 21.2 44.1 14.8 93.2 45.3 (13.6) 42.8 (1.9) 3.4 (4.2)
A 46.9 16.9 45.3 14.2 90.8 72.7 42.3 13.7 45.2 15.3 44.3 13.7 62.2 31.6 42.3 13.1 93.9 43.8 (14.4) 43.3 (2.0) 3.6 (4.3)
D
I-
FG
(T
)
R18 100.0 98.9 71.1 43.1 71.5 42.3 68.4 39.6 82.7 56.2 61.5 30.1 60.1 29.2 58.2 26.9 82.8 43.6 (13.5) 32.8 (0.7) 26.2 (8.8)
R50 80.8 54.5 100.0 98.3 64.5 32.6 76.6 49.6 66.4 36.1 74.8 44.7 59.6 28.5 61.8 30.5 86.7 43.6 (13.5) 33.0 (0.7) 25.3 (8.9)
A 60.5 28.0 54.8 23.4 100.0 97.9 52.5 20.4 56.9 25.7 53.9 22.1 85.2 64.0 50.9 18.8 86.6 36.6 (16.1) 32.6 (0.6) 26.5 (9.1)
R18+R50 100.0 99.1 100.0 98.8 68.4 37.1 86.5 62.8 83.8 59.9 77.0 49.2 63.2 31.8 68.7 38.9 85.0 43.5 (13.5) 32.7 (0.7) 27.6 (8.9)
R18+A 100.0 98.6 71.5 42.3 100.0 98.3 67.4 37.8 79.9 54.9 63.1 31.8 83.6 62.0 58.9 28.7 87.8 39.6 (15.0) 32.2 (0.6) 28.2 (9.0)
R50+A 83.2 59.6 100.0 98.2 100.0 98.4 75.2 48.1 71.4 42.4 74.1 45.2 82.8 61.4 62.8 32.5 92.2 39.8 (14.9) 32.3 (0.6) 27.5 (9.1)
R18+R50+A 100.0 98.5 100.0 98.4 99.9 98.2 87.1 65.0 83.2 59.0 76.7 48.5 83.3 61.6 69.4 40.1 89.0 40.5 (14.7) 32.0 (0.7) 29.1 (9.1)
D
I-
FG
(U
)
R18 92.4 86.0 89.5 67.6 73.5 41.3 89.1 64.6 89.7 71.7 74.6 43.4 67.6 34.8 73.9 42.1 53.2 43.4 (13.5) 32.9 (0.7) 25.8 (8.5)
R50 89.7 68.2 91.8 84.5 70.6 37.7 90.0 67.0 77.5 46.6 87.0 61.5 65.9 31.3 76.7 42.0 46.6 43.8 (13.5) 33.2 (0.7) 24.4 (8.5)
A 74.3 42.8 66.5 32.7 94.3 89.6 62.6 28.3 70.2 36.7 64.0 29.9 92.9 78.5 59.4 26.4 46.8 34.9 (16.6) 32.2 (0.6) 27.5 (9.0)
R18+R50 93.2 87.2 93.1 86.2 78.0 46.3 92.2 76.1 90.4 72.9 88.0 64.0 72.0 37.7 81.7 51.5 42.7 43.5 (13.5) 32.7 (0.7) 26.4 (8.6)
R18+A 92.2 86.1 89.6 67.3 94.0 87.8 88.4 64.4 89.4 70.5 76.8 46.1 90.3 72.5 76.6 44.5 51.1 40.0 (14.4) 32.3 (0.7) 27.6 (8.7)
R50+A 88.9 68.3 91.2 83.4 93.6 87.6 87.9 64.7 79.8 50.6 84.7 59.3 90.2 72.1 76.8 43.7 42.0 40.0 (14.4) 32.5 (0.7) 26.4 (8.6)
R18+R50+A 93.6 87.4 93.6 86.4 94.3 87.4 92.4 76.0 90.7 72.9 87.5 64.3 89.1 70.4 83.4 53.7 41.0 41.1 (14.0) 32.3 (0.7) 27.6 (8.7)
E
-F
G
R18 100.0 96.4 51.9 20.2 56.2 23.7 48.1 18.6 64.5 32.8 48.5 18.0 54.1 22.1 46.2 15.8 99.9 45.3 (13.3) 37.5 (2.3) 9.4 (7.5)
R50 55.1 24.9 100.0 95.9 55.8 23.8 50.7 19.7 51.2 20.2 58.8 27.1 53.8 21.9 46.0 16.2 99.9 44.7 (13.4) 37.3 (2.3) 9.7 (7.6)
A 49.2 19.4 48.5 16.3 100.0 97.0 45.5 15.5 48.9 17.6 47.4 15.6 69.2 39.7 44.9 14.5 99.8 38.9 (15.9) 36.1 (2.3) 13.3 (8.7)
R18+R50 100.0 97.4 100.0 96.9 58.1 26.1 58.7 27.3 67.0 35.6 60.9 29.0 55.1 23.9 50.1 19.9 100.0 44.9 (13.3) 35.7 (2.4) 13.9 (9.1)
R18+A 100.0 96.5 55.1 24.0 100.0 96.7 52.7 21.8 66.6 36.5 50.9 19.5 70.6 42.1 48.9 18.1 99.8 41.1 (14.7) 34.6 (2.3) 17.5 (9.8)
R50+A 59.6 28.9 100.0 96.1 100.0 96.6 54.7 22.6 54.4 22.3 59.6 28.2 70.1 41.3 49.4 18.4 99.9 40.9 (14.7) 34.6 (2.2) 17.2 (9.7)
R18+R50+A 100.0 97.4 100.0 96.8 100.0 97.3 62.3 31.4 73.5 43.8 66.2 35.2 73.9 46.5 57.0 24.7 99.9 41.8 (14.2) 33.8 (2.3) 19.8 (9.6)
R
P-
FG
(T
)
R18 100.0 98.4 62.6 31.8 62.3 29.7 60.4 30.1 94.4 80.1 58.6 27.9 62.0 30.6 56.0 25.1 67.0 44.8 (13.2) 33.6 (0.6) 23.0 (9.0)
R50 68.2 38.6 100.0 97.8 61.0 28.9 62.8 31.8 62.5 31.5 85.7 59.6 61.0 29.1 57.4 27.6 79.0 44.2 (13.4) 33.8 (0.5) 22.2 (9.0)
A 54.6 23.8 51.5 20.4 100.0 98.1 49.4 18.3 53.0 22.6 50.8 20.0 91.0 74.2 48.6 18.0 64.1 37.7 (15.7) 33.2 (0.6) 23.4 (9.1)
R18+R50 100.0 98.9 100.0 98.7 68.2 39.1 84.4 59.6 96.5 85.5 93.7 80.1 65.4 35.0 75.7 49.0 58.6 30.6 (7.0) 31.0 (0.5) 34.0 (10.9)
R18+A 100.0 98.7 71.4 43.5 100.0 98.2 67.2 39.8 93.8 78.2 66.5 36.5 91.9 75.8 63.0 33.3 65.5 30.6 (7.6) 30.8 (0.5) 33.9 (10.7)
R50+A 79.9 53.2 99.9 98.6 100.0 98.6 70.5 42.3 72.8 44.6 90.3 72.4 91.7 75.8 65.8 35.8 72.9 30.1 (7.5) 30.8 (0.5) 33.6 (10.8)
R18+R50+A 100.0 99.1 100.0 98.6 100.0 98.2 86.5 64.6 96.8 88.0 93.3 79.3 91.7 77.7 79.4 55.1 55.9 33.4 (7.4) 29.6 (0.4) 39.8 (11.5)
R
P-
FG
(U
)
R18 93.5 88.5 88.3 62.6 70.1 37.7 86.4 59.0 93.2 83.9 80.7 53.3 67.1 34.3 80.9 50.0 50.6 44.6 (13.1) 33.3 (0.6) 23.7 (8.8)
R50 88.3 63.1 92.9 86.9 67.6 34.9 88.1 60.5 83.6 55.2 92.3 79.3 65.4 32.1 81.7 52.7 42.9 44.2 (13.4) 33.6 (0.6) 22.5 (8.8)
A 67.6 34.4 60.1 26.7 95.6 91.1 56.8 22.8 66.0 33.1 59.6 26.1 94.9 86.6 56.7 22.7 47.3 36.1 (15.9) 32.4 (0.5) 26.1 (9.2)
R18+R50 95.1 90.6 94.4 88.6 79.6 50.2 93.5 78.5 93.6 83.3 93.8 84.5 76.2 45.9 89.8 67.5 41.7 45.3 (12.5) 30.9 (0.5) 34.1 (10.8)
R18+A 94.7 89.6 90.9 69.3 95.3 90.3 89.2 66.2 92.8 79.3 81.4 52.8 94.9 88.1 80.8 51.7 57.6 40.4 (13.9) 30.5 (0.5) 34.8 (10.6)
R50+A 91.6 72.5 94.0 87.8 95.2 90.3 90.6 68.0 85.4 59.8 90.1 70.3 94.7 88.4 82.0 50.7 49.0 40.0 (13.9) 30.6 (0.5) 34.2 (10.6)
R18+R50+A 97.0 93.8 95.9 91.0 95.7 91.0 95.2 82.6 96.5 91.7 95.4 87.7 94.9 84.4 93.2 77.0 45.3 41.5 (13.1) 29.4 (0.4) 40.5 (11.3)
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employed for crafting the adversarial images, with misleading
rates in the top-5 between 59.6% and 88.0% when targeted,
and between 70.3% and 91.7% when untargeted. When attack-
ing three classifiers, the misleading rate of E-FGSM drops
by 61.6% (35.2% from 96.8%) when defenses are applied.
Instead, RP-FGSM untargeted only drops by 3.3% (87.7%
from 91.0%).
When evaluating misleading unseen classifiers with de-
fenses, JSMA, CW, DeepFool and SparseFool still obtain the
lowest misleading rates (lower than 13.6% in top-5). Similarly,
FGSM-based attacks such as R-FGSM, L-FGSM, P-FGSM,
EOT and E-FGSM obtain very low misleading rates (under
24.7% in the top-5), while DI-FGSM, when attacking three
classifiers, obtains higher misleading rates with values of
40.1% (targeted) and 53.7% (untargeted). Also in this case, the
proposed RP-FGSM outperforms all other attacks, obtaining a
misleading rate in the top-5 of 55.1% (targeted) and of 84.4%
(untargeted). This confirms that untargeted attacks exhibit a
higher degree of privacy protection with unseen classifiers,
both with and without defenses.
Table IV compares predicted probabilities of sample adver-
sarial images. We observe that most of the adversarial attacks
are unsuitable for privacy protection as the true class might
be within the top-5. DI-FGSM and RP-FGSM are the only
attacks capable of removing the true class from the top-5 for
all classifiers in both seen (ResNet18, ResNet50 and AlexNet)
and unseen (DenseNet161) settings. This is mainly due to the
fact that the attacks do not overfit the perturbations to a specific
classifier and that the crafted perturbations generate adversarial
predicted classes that are far from the predicted class in the
decision space.
Targeted attacks are in general more detectable than their
untargeted versions, as reaching the target class often means
crafting a larger perturbation. R-FGSM, L-FGSM, P-FGSM,
EOT and E-FGSM are highly detectable, with values above
93.2%, while U-FGSM obtains detection rates below 58.1%.
The detectability of targeted DI-FGSM is between 82.8% and
92.2%, and that of targeted RP-FGSM between 55.9% and
79.0% (RP-FGSM is less detectable than DI-FGSM in this
setting). Untargeted DI-FGSM obtains detectability between
41.0% and 53.2%, while untargeted RP-FGSM between 41.7%
and 57.5%, thus resulting in DI-FGSM being slightly less
detectable than RP-FGSM. JSMA and SparseFool have the
lowest detection rates, with values under 34.8%.
Attacks with a sparse perturbation, such as JSMA and
SparseFool, have the highest image quality results (PSNR val-
ues above 38.4 dB). However, sparse perturbations are often of
high magnitude (Figure 1 and Table IV) and, therefore, highly
noticeable (Table IV). This effect is reflected by the poor
BRISQUE score, above 51 points, for JSMA and SparseFool.
Attacks with dense perturbations obtain a lower PSNR than
sparse ones, whose accumulated variation of intensity across
the whole image is smaller. However, dense perturbations
might be more desirable for privacy protection, as they are
less visible and their per-pixel intensity variation is lower than
that of sparse attacks. FGSM-based attacks obtain consistently
better BRISQUE scores than non-FGSM based attacks. On
average, FGSM-based attacks obtain 44 BRISQUE points and
non-FGSM based attacks obtain 5 points more (the lower the
better). EOT, which has an image quality regularization in its
modeling (see Eq. 12), is the FGSM-based attack with the
highest PSNR results (above 42.3 dB) and the lowest MAD
score (below 3.6 points). However, its BRISQUE scores are
higher (i.e. worse) than those of other FGSM-based attacks,
thus indicating a lower image naturalness. When the number
of classifiers used to create the adversarial images increases,
a higher level of perturbations is required, which results in a
decrease of image quality. For instance, we see a decrease of
about 4 dB when DI-FGSM, E-FGSM and RP-FGSM employ
three classifiers instead of only one. However, FGSM-based
attacks can obtain the desired trade-off between misleading
rate and image quality by tuning the parameter  (Eq. 11), a
desirable feature for applications such as privacy protection
(see the sensitivity analysis in Sec. V-E). RP-FGSM obtains
quality scores comparable to other FGSM-based attacks in
terms of BRISQUE and PSNR. For instance, when attacking
three classifiers, E-FGSM obtains BRISQUE score 41.8 and
PSNR 33.8 dB, whereas RP-FGSM obtains BRISQUE score
33.4 (the lower the better) and PSNR 29.6 dB (the higher
the better). However, among the FGSM methods for three
classifiers, E-FGSM obtains the best MAD score 19.8, whereas
RP-FGSM obtains the worst MAD score 40.5 (the lower the
better). Visual samples of adversarial images can be seen in
Table IV.
E. Ablation and sensitivity analysis
We present two analyses of RP-FGSM, namely an ablation
study to validate the effectiveness of the random selection
of classifier and transformation, and of different number of
iterations; and a sensitivity analysis on the parameter .
The ablation study compares the effect of using a ran-
domly selected transformation with respect to not using any
transformations, and the effect of using randomly selected
classifiers with respect to using an ensemble of classifiers at
each iteration [6]. Furthermore, we evaluate the effect of the
number of iterations, N , when attacking multiple classifiers.
For a fair comparison, all these experiments follow the same
sequence of transformations, classifiers and target class, when-
ever applicable, by fixing the random seed. We report the
variation of performance measures, namely misleading rates
with and without defense, and detectability, for both targeted
and untargeted RP-FGSM.
Table V shows the effect of using random transformations
with respect to not using any transformation. When employing
a single classifier, using transformations generally improves
the misleading and decreases the detectability. In particular,
the detectability decreases by an average of 19.4% (5.5%) in
the targeted (untargeted) version. When using an ensemble of
classifiers, the misleading generally increases for both targeted
and untargeted. For the untargeted version, the detectability
increases by an average of 9.5%, whereas for the targeted
one, increases by an average of 19.3%. We argue that using an
ensemble of classifiers generates overfitted perturbations that
successfully mislead the classifier, but are more detectable.
When using a random classifier at each iteration, as we
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TABLE IV
EXAMPLE OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AND TOP-5 PREDICTIONS WITH DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS. ATTACKS SHOWN ARE THE BEST-PERFORMING WITH
RESPECT TO THE SET OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING PERFORMANCE MEASURES. CW, DEEPFOOL, SPARSEFOOL, U-FGSM, P-FGSM, AND EOT USE
RESNET50; DI-FGSM, E-FGSM AND RP-FGSM USE A COMBINATION OF RESNET18, RESNET50 AND ALEXNET; DI-FGSM AND RP-FGSM ARE
PRESENTED WITH THEIR UNTARGETED VERSIONS. FIRST AND SIXTH COLUMN: ORIGINAL OR ADVERSARIAL IMAGE; OTHER COLUMNS: TOP-5
PREDICTED CLASSES AND CORRESPONDING PROBABILITY VALUE; GREEN SHADING: SUCCESSFULLY PREDICTED TRUE CLASS; RED SHADING: TRUE
CLASS IS WITHIN THE TOP-5 PREDICTIONS.
ResNet18 ResNet50 AlexNet DenseNet161 ResNet18 ResNet50 AlexNet DenseNet161
Original P-FGSM
jacuzzi 87.2 jacuzzi 87.4 jacuzzi 83.5 jacuzzi 90.4 jacuzzi 77.3 garage 100.0 jacuzzi 62.2 jacuzzi 77.2
swim. pool 7.1 swim. pool 6.7 swim. pool 6.7 hot spring 6.4 swim. pool 19.3 parking 0.0 fishpond 6.2 swim. pool 19.3
hot spring 2.5 hot spring 3.5 patio 1.5 swim. pool 3.0 fountain 0.5 garage 0.0 patio 5.4 lobby 0.6
fountain 0.9 sauna 0.6 hot spring 1.2 water park 0.1 hot spring 0.5 bus station 0.0 swim. pool 4.6 fountain 0.4
water park 0.7 water park 0.5 porch 1.1 sauna 0.0 water park 0.3 subway st. 0.0 loading dock 2.6 hot spring 0.2
CW EOT
swim. pool 52.0 swim. pool 52.0 jacuzzi 82.3 jacuzzi 86.8 jacuzzi 84.1 greenho. ind. 52.5 jacuzzi 81.8 jacuzzi 93.6
jacuzzi 31.6 jacuzzi 31.6 swim. pool 7.2 hot spring 7.8 swim. pool 4.9 greenho. out. 44.9 swim. pool 5.1 swim. pool 2.7
hot spring 4.7 hot spring 4.7 patio 1.5 swim. pool 5.0 fountain 3.7 pet shop 1.8 fishpond 3.2 hot spring 1.8
water park 3.4 water park 3.4 hot spring 1.2 water park 0.1 hot spring 1.7 roof garden 0.5 patio 1.7 fountain 0.3
swim. pool 2.7 swim. pool 2.7 porch 1.1 sauna 0.1 water park 1.7 aquarium 0.1 hot spring 1.3 fishpond 0.3
DeepFool DI-FGSM
jacuzzi 82.9 hot spring 64.4 jacuzzi 82.7 jacuzzi 83.9 amus. park 98.9 fastfood rest. 91.7 lock chamb 56.7 rest. patio 17.6
swim. pool 8.9 jacuzzi 24.0 swim. pool 6.8 hot spring 12.3 carrousel 0.9 food court 3.2 canal 21.9 diner 14.7
hot spring 3.7 swim. pool 4.8 patio 1.6 swim. pool 3.3 water park 0.2 icecream parlor 1.1 boathouse 14.9 food court 13.4
water park 1.3 water park 1.6 hot spring 1.3 water park 0.1 playground 0.0 coffee shop 0.9 lake 1.4 amus. park 8.9
fountain 1.1 sauna 1.0 porch 1.1 sauna 0.1 ticket booth 0.0 cafeteria 0.8 bridge 1.1 coffee shop 8.5
SparseFool E-FGSM
jacuzzi 88.5 hot spring 46.1 jacuzzi 80.9 jacuzzi 85.6 foot. field 99.5 foot. field 99 foot. field 99.7 jacuzzi 74.6
swim. pool 6.6 jacuzzi 45.7 swim. pool 6.5 hot spring 11.0 stadium 0.4 stadium foot. 0.9 stadium 0.2 swim. pool 6.4
hot spring 2.3 swim. pool 5.2 patio 2.1 swim. pool 3.0 soc. field 0.0 stadium base. 0.0 soc. field 0.1 hot spring 5.6
fountain 0.9 sauna 0.9 fishpond 1.6 water park 0.1 athl. field 0.0 athl. field 0.0 basket. court 0.0 fountain 5.2
water park 0.8 water park 0.5 hot spring 1.3 sauna 0.1 stadium 0.0 soc. field 0.0 stadium 0.0 water park 1.6
U-FGSM RP-FGSM
hot spring 88.3 hot spring 100 jacuzzi 83.5 hot spring 95.8 boathouse 96 fastfood rest. 40.8 lock chamb 99.9 amus. park 27.3
jacuzzi 5.2 volcano 0.0 swim. pool 6.7 jacuzzi 3.3 lock chamb 3.3 icecream parlor 12.7 boathouse 0.0 boathouse 9.7
water park 3.1 fountain 0.0 patio 1.5 swim. pool 0.5 pier 0.2 coffee shop 12.6 bridge 0.0 lock chamb 7.2
swim. pool 1.3 waterfall 0.0 hot spring 1.2 fountain 0.2 harbor 0.2 pizzeria 12.4 canal urb. 0.0 pet shop 4.0
fountain 0.9 mountain 0.0 porch 1.1 water park 0.1 canal 0.1 diner 9.7 canal nat. 0.0 rail. track 3.7
propose, the misleading with defense increases in both targeted
and untargeted versions. Moreover, the detectability in the un-
targeted attack decreases, contrary to when using an ensemble
of classifiers. This experiment shows how introducing random
transformations improves the performance, especially when a
random classifier is employed in each iteration.
Table VI compares the effect of using a randomly selected
classifier with respect to using an ensemble of classifiers,
at each iteration. We report the results when not using any
transformation, for reference, and also when using random
selection of transformations. When random transformations
are employed in the generation, the use of a randomly selected
classifier at each iteration increases, in general, the misleading
rate in the targeted version by a maximum in top-1 of unseen
classifier (DenseNet) 4.2%. Also, detectability decreases by
12.5% (5.2%) in the targeted (untargeted) version. Some
instances of misleading rate decreases are observed, especially
in the untargeted version.
Table VII reports how results vary using a random selection
of the classifier with respect to an ensemble of classifiers,
with varying numbers of iterations. We report the performance
measures with the proposed number of iterations (i.e. 40,
with two classifiers; and 60, with three classifiers), which
allows the proposed attack to perform the same number of
forward and backward passes on the classifiers compared to
an ensemble FGSM (e.g. E-FGSM). We also study the effect
of the number of iterations on the performance measures by
considering fewer iterations (i.e. 20). For an equal number of
uses of a classifier, the random selection of classifier improves
the misleading of unseen classifiers by 16.4% in the top-5
(when using three classifiers), and decreases the detectability
by 28.7%. Moreover, when the ensemble uses the classifiers
three times more than RP-FGSM, RP-FGSM still outperforms
the use of ensemble by an average of 15.0% in terms of
misleading rate for classifiers with defense and by 28.9% in
detectability (Table VII, last row).
This ablation study confirms that randomly selecting clas-
sifiers and transformations can improve the misleading rate,
with and without defenses, when attacks are evaluated on the
same number of forward/backward passes of a classifier.
Figure 5 reports the effect of varying the parameter  =
{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64} (larger values would produce lower
quality images [12]). Image quality is reported by PSNR,
and we attack single classifiers, i.e. ResNet18, ResNet50 and
AlexNet, and also their combination. With seen classifiers,
misleading rates above 95% occur with  larger than 8 (with
defenses) and 32 (without defenses). With unseen classifiers,
the proposed attack performs similarly with and without de-
fenses, thus supporting the use of transformations to make the
adversarial images robust to defenses. The proposed strategy
of randomly choosing a classifier at each iteration, when
multiple classifiers are considered, increases the misleading
rate with unseen classifiers as shown in the first two plots
on the right column. The detectability rate does not show a
clear relation with the parameter , as it remains between 40%
and 80% for any  when one classifier is attacked. When
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TABLE V
IMPACT ON MISLEADING AND DETECTABILITY OF USING A RANDOM TRANSFORMATION IN CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS (VALUES ARE
THE VARIATION OF THE SCORE COMPARED TO THE SCORE OBTAINED WHEN NO TRANSFORMATION IS USED). GREEN SHADING REPRESENTS AN
INCREASE IN MISLEADING RATE OR A DECREASE IN DETECTABILITY. RED SHADING REPRESENTS A DECREASE IN MISLEADING RATE OR AN INCREASE
IN DETECTABILITY. KEY – CLASS. COMB.: CLASSIFIER COMBINATION; N/A: NOT APPLICABLE; R18: RESNET18; R50: RESNET50; A: ALEXNET.
Targeted Untargeted
Class. Classifier
Misleading ↑ Misleading with defense ↑
Det. ↓
Misleading ↑ Misleading with defense ↑
Det. ↓comb. R18 R50 A DN R18 R50 A DN R18 R50 A DN R18 R50 A DNT1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5
N/A
R18 0.0 0.1 2.6 2.7 1.4 2.6 2.1 2.6 -0.3 -3.3 -0.7 -2.2 -2.1 -0.5 -1.3 -0.9 -23.0 1.9 2.2 1.5 6.8 2.5 3.5 1.1 5.6 26.2 52.7 -5.3 23.4 4.9 4.9 13.7 16.1 -7.4
R50 4.6 5.6 0.0 0.1 2.5 2.1 4.2 4.2 6.6 5.7 22.5 30.2 2.1 3.3 7.6 6.7 -17.8 2.1 9.0 1.3 2.4 2.6 4.1 2.2 8.3 10.9 19.0 11.8 36.4 4.2 5.0 14.5 20.3 -8.8
A 1.1 0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.8 2.1 1.2 0.8 14.7 24.4 1.1 0.2 -17.3 -4.9 -5.8 -7.0 -6.2 1.8 2.3 -6.5 -5.9 -0.4 1.5 -1.0 -1.4 3.5 13.0 -1.5 -1.4 -0.2
Average 1.9 2.1 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.7 1.5 7.7 9.6 4.9 9.1 2.5 2.0 -19.4 -0.3 1.8 -1.4 1.0 2.3 3.3 -1.1 2.7 12.2 24.4 1.8 19.5 4.2 7.6 8.9 11.7 -5.5
Ensemble
R18+R50 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.7 1.7 2.1 3.4 4.9 18.6 29.2 10.5 16.5 3.3 2.4 10.3 12.7 -22.7 0.6 1.3 0.8 1.5 2.3 5.8 0.4 1.3 2.9 12.8 5.0 19.0 5.6 10.4 7.9 18.1 9.0
R18+A 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.6 0.0 -0.6 1.5 2.3 19.1 28.5 5.6 6.2 8.5 18.2 28.1 -0.8 -18.7 1.0 1.7 0.5 3.4 0.9 2.5 0.5 2.7 3.6 14.0 8.9 15.1 3.7 12.0 8.6 15.2 8.7
R50+A 4.2 5.3 -0.1 -0.9 0.0 -1.0 1.9 3.5 8.8 10.0 19.1 26.2 11.5 17.5 7.5 -18.8 -8.8 2.2 4.3 1.3 2.3 1.0 2.5 1.5 2.8 8.0 14.8 7.0 20.4 3.9 12.0 8.9 15.2 10.1
R18+R50+A 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 -1.0 -0.1 -1.7 3.1 3.6 24.4 35.9 12.0 18.4 9.4 13.7 10.3 13.9 -12.6 1.9 4.3 2.2 4.6 1.6 5.2 2.8 8.1 4.7 17.7 8.1 24.9 6.6 17.8 10.9 27.5 9.8
Average 1.1 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 -0.3 2.5 3.6 17.7 25.9 11.8 16.8 8.2 13.0 14.1 1.8 -15.7 1.7 3.5 1.4 3.4 1.2 3.4 1.6 4.5 5.4 15.5 8.0 20.1 4.7 13.9 9.5 19.3 9.5
Random
R18+R50 -0.4 -2.1 -0.2 -0.8 0.4 0.7 -1.5 -0.7 9.8 16.5 14.9 18.7 1.5 1.8 6.6 5.7 -14.0 0.9 1.8 1.0 1.6 4.0 6.9 1.3 6.8 9.0 27.4 4.6 17.8 6.1 9.5 11.9 24.1 -9.9
R18+A -0.6 -3.8 -1.9 -2.0 -0.2 0.3 -1.5 -0.9 8.9 11.0 2.6 2.5 11.5 17.6 2.4 1.9 -5.8 1.1 2.0 2.1 5.1 1.2 1.1 1.9 5.3 4.9 15.3 7.3 11.2 4.3 13.2 7.2 11.9 -2.8
R50+A -7.0 -8.2 -2.8 -9.4 -0.0 0.1 -5.8 -16.1 3.5 5.5 7.4 7.7 11.7 17.9 2.5 2.9 0.1 2.5 6.9 1.1 1.6 1.0 0.8 2.8 8.2 7.7 12.9 8.2 18.4 3.8 15.8 8.3 11.6 -2.9
R18+R50+A -0.3 -2.3 -2.3 -8.3 -1.3 -2.3 -2.9 -2.9 1.9 3.7 19.3 27.8 9.5 11.3 4.0 5.0 -7.9 2.4 4.5 2.1 3.8 -0.4 -0.6 2.5 11.4 5.1 27.1 8.8 31.6 3.1 13.9 12.4 30.7 -3.1
Average -2.1 -4.1 -1.8 -5.1 -0.3 -0.3 -2.9 -5.2 6.0 9.2 11.1 14.2 8.6 12.2 3.9 3.9 -6.9 2.0 4.5 1.8 3.5 0.6 0.4 2.4 8.3 5.9 18.4 8.1 20.4 3.7 14.3 9.3 18.1 -2.9
TABLE VI
IMPACT ON MISLEADING AND DETECTABILITY OF USING A RANDOMLY SELECTED CLASSIFIER IN CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS (VALUES
ARE THE VARIATION OF THE SCORE COMPARED TO THE SCORE OBTAINED WHEN COMBINING CLASSIFIERS AS AN ENSEMBLE [6]). GREEN SHADING
REPRESENTS AN INCREASE IN MISLEADING RATE OR A DECREASE IN DETECTABILITY. RED SHADING REPRESENTS A DECREASE IN MISLEADING RATE
OR AN INCREASE IN DETECTABILITY. KEY – TRANS.: TRANSFORMATION; N/A: NOT APPLICABLE; R18: RESNET18; R50: RESNET50; A: ALEXNET.
Targeted Untargeted
Trans. Classifier
Misleading ↑ Misleading with defense ↑
Det. ↓
Misleading ↑ Misleading with defense ↑
Det. ↓R18 R50 A DN R18 R50 A DN R18 R50 A DN R18 R50 A DN
T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5
N/A
R18+R50 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.7 -2.0 -2.4 -1.2 -2.0 -10.1 -10.8 -0.3 -1.0 -1.6 -0.9 0.6 1.1 1.6 0.4 0.8 -2.5 -3.0 -0.1 -4.3 -5.8 -17.2 1.2 2.7 -1.8 -1.0 -3.9 -8.0 8.9
R18+A 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -1.1 0.0 -0.6 -1.7 -1.5 -2.1 -1.9 -1.1 -1.3 -1.8 -1.9 21.9 -7.5 0.7 1.3 1.6 -0.8 -2.9 0.2 1.2 -1.0 -3.4 -1.5 -6.6 -2.6 -4.5 0.4 0.0 -2.8 -4.8 9.8
R50+A 4.2 5.3 0.0 -1.1 -0.1 -0.8 1.9 13.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -2.5 -1.5 -26.9 -8.0 0.4 -2.6 1.7 2.8 0.6 1.7 0.2 -4.8 -2.1 -4.0 -2.8 -7.4 0.7 0.2 -3.4 -4.4 9.8
R18+R50+A 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.9 -0.2 -3.1 -2.4 -3.7 4.5 5.0 -8.1 -10.1 -2.7 -3.8 -2.6 -2.2 0.2 1.2 2.1 0.3 0.8 1.8 4.3 0.2 -4.4 0.7 -8.2 -1.0 -10.1 2.8 0.2 -2.5 -7.4 7.0
Average 1.1 1.2 -0.5 -1.0 -0.2 -1.3 -1.1 1.4 -0.1 0.0 -5.2 -5.9 -1.5 -2.3 4.1 -9.4 -1.6 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.0 1.1 -0.2 -4.2 -2.2 -9.0 -1.3 -4.8 0.5 -0.2 -3.2 -6.2 8.9
Random
R18+R50 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7 36.6 65.4 8.7 11.1 0.6 1.8 7.4 11.0 1.3 5.4 9.7 11.6 -7.9 1.3 2.1 0.6 0.9 -0.8 -1.9 0.8 1.2 0.3 -2.6 0.8 1.5 -1.3 -1.9 0.1 -2.0 -10.0
R18+A 0.0 0.6 7.4 8.6 0.0 0.9 7.2 8.8 -3.3 -5.1 5.6 6.2 12.2 19.0 5.9 6.8 -3.4 1.4 1.9 0.8 -1.3 0.5 -0.2 0.4 -0.8 -0.2 -5.3 -4.2 -8.4 1.0 1.2 -4.2 -8.1 -1.7
R50+A 6.7 10.0 0.1 1.4 0.0 0.5 8.7 10.1 5.8 8.3 -3.3 -5.0 8.9 18.8 5.1 7.2 -9.8 0.6 0.0 1.5 2.2 0.5 0.1 1.5 0.6 -2.4 -5.9 -1.6 -9.4 0.6 4.0 -4.0 -8.0 -3.2
R18+R50+A 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.6 0.0 1.1 11.4 16.4 3.9 9.6 8.5 19.1 6.2 12.0 8.9 12.4 -28.7 1.7 2.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -1.5 0.0 -1.1 1.1 1.2 -0.3 -3.4 -0.7 -3.7 -1.0 -4.2 -5.9
Average 1.7 3.1 1.9 3.1 9.2 17.0 9.0 11.6 1.8 3.7 4.6 7.8 7.2 13.8 7.4 9.5 -12.5 1.3 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.0 -0.9 0.7 0.0 -0.3 -3.2 -1.3 -4.9 -0.1 -0.1 -2.3 -5.6 -5.2
TABLE VII
IMPACT ON MISLEADING AND DETECTABILITY OF USING A RANDOM SELECTION OF CLASSIFIERS WITH VARYING NUMBER OF ITERATIONS IN CRAFTING
ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS (VALUES ARE THE VARIATION OF THE SCORE COMPARED TO THE SCORE OBTAINED WHEN USING AN ENSEMBLE OF
CLASSIFIERS [6]). GREEN SHADING REPRESENTS AN INCREASE IN MISLEADING RATE OR A DECREASE IN DETECTABILITY. RED SHADING REPRESENTS
A DECREASE IN MISLEADING RATE OR AN INCREASE IN DETECTABILITY.
Misleading ↑ Misleading with defense ↑
Det. ↓# iterations
Ensemble
# iterations
Random Classifier
R18 R50 A DN R18 R50 A DN
T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5 T1 T5
20 20
R18+R50 -0.4 -1.9 -0.2 -0.9 -1.8 -2.1 -6.9 -8.0 -10.0 -14.7 -5.7 -8.6 -2.1 -1.6 -5.3 -7.9 9.3
R18+A -0.6 -3.8 -5.1 -5.7 -0.2 0.3 -4.7 -4.7 -12.3 -19.4 -4.1 -5.0 1.2 -2.5 -3.8 -4.8 13.6
R50+A -7.0 -8.2 -2.7 -9.6 -0.1 0.3 -5.8 -6.6 -6.8 -5.7 -13.2 -19.7 -1.1 -2.1 -6.5 -5.2 0.9
R18+R50+A -0.3 -1.8 -2.3 -8.2 -1.4 -3.7 -8.4 -10.2 -18.0 -27.2 -0.8 -0.7 -2.6 -6.2 -8.9 -11.1 4.9
20 40
R18+R50 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7 36.6 65.4 8.7 11.1 0.6 1.8 7.4 11.0 1.3 5.4 9.7 11.6 -7.9
R18+A 0.0 0.6 7.4 8.6 0.0 0.9 7.2 8.8 -3.3 -5.1 5.6 6.2 12.2 19.0 5.9 6.8 -3.4
R50+A 6.7 10.0 0.1 1.4 0.0 0.5 8.7 10.1 5.8 8.3 -3.3 -5.0 8.9 18.8 5.1 7.2 -9.8
20 60 R18+R50+A 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.6 0.0 1.1 11.4 16.4 3.9 9.6 8.5 19.1 6.2 12.0 8.9 12.4 -28.7
60 60 R18+R50+A 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 6.6 10.7 15.2 28.1 21.2 37.0 10.4 18.7 13.1 18.3 -28.9
three classifiers are attacked the detection rate increases for
 = {1, 2, 4, 8} and it establishes at around 80% for larger .
Image quality monotonically decreases when  increases.
However, when multiple classifiers are used the PSNR does
not significantly change.
F. Runtime analysis
We compare the runtime of each attack in an Ubuntu 18.04.3
server equipped with an NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU, using a
random subset of 300 images. The implementations are in
Python using the PyTorch library [28]. Figure 6(a) shows that
JSMA, CW and SparseFool are the slowest attacks taking on
average 52.14, 9.87 and 4.42 seconds per image, respectively,
when attacking ResNet50. DeepFool and FGSM-based attacks
have a similar runtime performance with an average under
0.7 seconds per image. Figure 6(b) shows how the runtime of
RP-FGSM increases when the number of attacked classifiers
increases (similarly to DI-FGSM and E-FGSM). The major
factor affecting the runtime is the forward/backward passes
on the classifier.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented RP-FGSM, a Robust and Private Fast Gradient
Sign Method that is designed to mislead seen and unseen
classifiers with and without a known defense. RP-FGSM
has better performance than other state-of-the-art adversarial
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Fig. 5. Sensitivity analysis of targeted RP-FGSM when  varies. The mislead-
ing rate is evaluated on top-1 on the test dataset. When using three classifiers
to craft the adversarial images, they are evaluated with the most accurate
classifier, ResNet50 (seen classifier) and DenseNet161 (unseen classifier).
KEY – : ResNet18; : ResNet50, : AlexNet; : the three classifiers;
MS: misleading a seen classifier; MU: misleading an unseen classifier; MSwD:
MS with defense; MUwD: MU with defense.
attacks for privacy protection in the Private Places365 dataset,
especially for unseen classifiers and when defenses are applied.
The key for this performance is the iterative random selection
of a defense transformation and a classifier at each iteration,
which prevents the crafted perturbation from overfitting to a
particular classifier or defense.
As future work, we will investigate adversarial attacks that
mislead unknown defenses and we will extend the validation
to tasks beyond scene classification.
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